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We show that the US Debt/GDP ratio is negatively correlated with the spread between corporate bond
yields and Treasury bond yields. The result holds even when controlling for the default risk on corporate
bonds. We argue that the corporate bond spread reflects a convenience yield that investors attribute
to Treasury debt. Changes in the supply of Treasury debt trace out the demand for convenience by
investors. We show that the aggregate demand curve for the convenience provided by Treasury debt
is downward sloping and provide estimates of the elasticity of demand. We analyze disaggregated
data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve and show that individual groups of Treasury
holders also have downward sloping demand curves. Even groups with the most elastic demand curves
have demand curves that are far from flat. The results have bearing for important questions in finance
and macroeconomics. We discuss implications for the behavior of corporate bond spreads, interest
rate swap spreads, the riskless interest rate, and the value of aggregate liquidity. We also discuss the
implications of our results for the financing of the US deficit, Ricardian equivalence, and the effects
of foreign central bank demand on Treasury yields.
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Figure 1 graphs the yield spread between AAA rated corporate bonds and Treasury securities against the
US government debt-to-GDP ratio (i.e. the ratio of the face value of publicly held US government debt to
US GDP). The ﬁgure suggests that the corporate bond spread is high when the stock of debt is low, while
the spread is low when the stock of debt is high.























The corporate bond spread (y-axis) is graphed versus the Debt/GDP ratio (x-
axis) based on annual observations from 1925 to 2005. The bond spread is the
diﬀerence between the percentage yield on Moody’s AAA long maturity bond
index and the percentage yield on long maturity Treasury bonds.
In the next sections of the paper, we argue that the negative correlation between the debt-to-GDP ratio
and the corporate bond spread arises because of variation in the “convenience yield” on Treasury securities,
rather than variation in the default risk of corporate borrowers. Investors place a value on Treasury securities
– the convenience value – above and beyond the securities’ cash ﬂows. When the stock of debt is low, the
marginal convenience valuation of debt is high. Investors bid up the price of Treasuries relative to other
securities such as corporate bonds, causing the yield on Treasuries to fall further below corporate bond
rates, and the bond spread to widen. The opposite applies when the stock of debt is high. Variation in the
supply of Treasury securities traces out a downward sloping demand curve for Treasuries. We estimate the
semi-elasticity of the corporate bond spread to the Debt/GDP ratio, ﬁnding that a hypothetical increase
2in the Debt/GDP ratio from the current level of 0.3 8t oan e wl e v e lo f0 .39 will raise long term Treasury
yields by between 1.5bps (Table I-A, Panel B, column (2)) and 4.25bps (Table IV-B, column (2)), relative to
corporate bond yields.
Sections 2, 3, 4, and 6 present these results relating the aggregate supply of Treasury securities to the
spread between corporate and Treasury bond yields. We show that the results are robust to adding various
controls for corporate default risk. We also show the results hold when the dependent variable is the spread
between a short-maturity corporate bond and Treasury bond, or is the spread between the realized excess
returns of corporate bonds over Treasury bonds. These results along with a number of other robustness
checks presented in Section 8 strongly support the existence of a convenience yield on Treasury securities.
Section 5 of the paper examines which groups of investors are the strongest drivers of the convenience
value of Treasury securities. We ﬁrst argue that diﬀerent groups of Treasury owners likely have diﬀerent
motives for holding Treasuries. We then estimate which groups have the least elastic demand curves in order
to determine which of the various motives are likely to contribute substantially to the convenience yield on
Treasuries. We oﬀer three motives: The ﬁrst is a liquidity motive. Treasury securities are extremely liquid
in comparison to corporate bonds. For example, Reinhart and Sack (2000) note that bid-oﬀer spreads on
corporate bonds are four to six times larger than those of Treasury bonds. The liquidity motive is analogous
to the demand for holding money. Like Treasuries, money oﬀers a low rate of return and yet is held in
equilibrium. Theories of money demand suggest that this is because agents derive special liquidity services
from holding money. For oﬃcial groups (foreign central banks, US regional Federal Reserve banks and US
state and local governments) and for groups such as banks and households (including mutual funds) the
liquidity of Treasuries may be very important. The second motive is a neutrality motive. Kohn (2005)
suggest that a key reason for why the US federal reserve banks mainly hold Treasury securities is that they
do not wish to favor any non-governmental borrower over another. A similar motive may apply to state and
local governments and foreign central banks. The third motive is that Treasuries are widely considered the
lowest risk interest bearing asset. The surety of Treasuries may be attractive for unsophisticated investors
who are unable to assess the risk in corporate assets.
We study disaggregated data from the Flow of Funds Accounts and estimate demand curves for each of
the main groups that hold Treasuries. We ﬁnd that the Treasury demands of oﬃcial groups (foreign central
banks, US regional Federal Reserve banks and US state and local governments) are the least sensitive to
the corporate bond spread. Banks, households and the foreign private sector have somewhat more elastic
Treasury demands, while groups who likely have very long investment horizons (state/local government
retirement funds, private pension funds and insurance companies) have the most elastic Treasury demands.
These ﬁndings suggest the liquidity and neutrality motives are primary factors behind the “convenience
value” from holding Treasuries.
3Our results have bearing for important questions in both ﬁnance and macroeconomics. In section 7 of
the paper we discuss implications of our ﬁndings for the behavior of corporate bond spreads, the riskless
interest rate, the value of aggregate liquidity, and the ﬁnancing of the US deﬁcit. We also use our demand
curve estimates to quantify the eﬀects of foreign central bank demand on Treasury yields.
Relation to Literature
Our ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant non-default component in the corporate bond spread is consistent with some
recent papers in the corporate bond pricing literature (see Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001),
Huang and Huang (2001), and Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005)). We also present evidence that the
interest rate swap spread – that is the spread between corporate-referenced swap rates and Treasury bond
rates – has a signiﬁcant non-default component. Duﬃe and Singleton (1997), Grinblatt (2001), He (2001),
Liu, Longstaﬀ, and Mandell (2004), Li (2004), and Feldhutter and Lando (2005) argue for a signiﬁcant
non-default component in the interest rate swap spread. Papers in the prior literature use information from
the corporate bond market to estimate the default component of interest rate spreads, and label the residual
as a non-default component.1 Compared to the prior literature, the novelty of our work is to oﬀer a direct
test of the convenience yield hypothesis and to document that the amount of Treasuries outstanding is a key
driver of the non-default component of the corporate bond spread and of the interest rate swap spread.
We are aware of only a few papers in the literature that have noted a correlation between the supply of
government debt and interest rate spreads. Cortes (2003)documents a correlation between the US Debt/GDP
ratio and swap spreads over a period from 1994 to 2003. Longstaﬀ (2004) documents a correlation between
the supply of Treasury debt and the spread between Refcorp bonds and Treasury bonds over a period from
1991 to 2001.2,3 Relative to both Cortes and Longstaﬀ we study a longer sample, provide a theoretical
basis to study the relation, and present a more detailed empirical analysis. In particular, we use several
approaches to rule out that the relation could be driven by time-varying default risk, and we estimate group
1Some of the papers in the prior literaturealso show that the non-defaultcomponent is related to the specialness of particular
Treasury securities. A particular Treasury bond is “special” if the cost of borrowing the bond in the repurchase market exceeds
that of other Treasury bonds with similar maturity and cash-ﬂow characteristics. Specialness leads to the yield on the special
Treasury bond to fall below comparable Treasury bonds. See Krishnamurthy (2002) for further discussion of specialness. In a
sense, we show that the entire Treasury market is “special” relative to other asset markets, and not just that one Treasury is
special relative to another Treasury.
2Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001), Krishnamurthy (2002), and Sundaresan and Wang (2006) present evidence that the auc-
tioned amount of speciﬁc Treasury securities aﬀects the value of these securities. Krishnamurthy (2002) and Sundaresan and
Wang (2006) suggest that the link is due to the specialness of particular Treasury securities. These papers oﬀer evidence that
supply has an eﬀect on the relative price of Treasury securities to other Treasury securities, not the relative price of Treasury
securities to non-Treasury assets.
3Reinhart and Sack (2000) document a relation between the projected government deﬁcit and the slope of the Treasury yield
curve. They suggest that the relation is evidence of a supply eﬀect: An expected change in the stock of debt causes investors
to change the yield on long-term Treasury securities more than that of short-term securities.
4level demand curves to shed light on which motives drive the relation between the corporate bond spread
and the supply of Treasuries at the aggregate level. Dittmar and Yuan (2006) study a sample of sovereign
and corporate bonds in emerging markets and show that the issuance of new sovereign bonds lowers yield
spreads and bid-ask spreads of existing corporate bonds. Their result is suggestive that the convenience yield
in government bonds may be an international phenomenon.
In macroeconomics, there is a large literature exploring the Ricardian equivalence proposition (Barro,
1974), that the ﬁnancing choices of the government used to fund a given stream of government expenditures
is irrelevant for equilibrium quantities and prices. One implication of the Ricardian equivalence proposition
is that the size of government debt has no causal eﬀect on interest rates. Despite a large amount of research
devoted to studying this topic, there is yet no clear consensus on the eﬀects of debt on interest rates (see, for
example, the survey by Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999)). Barro (1987), Evans (1986) and Plosser (1986) ﬁnd
little or no eﬀect of government debt on interest rates. Laubach (2005) does ﬁnd such an eﬀect when using
forecast levels of government debt rather than currently measured levels (Laubach reports a 4 − 5 bps eﬀect
per one percentage point increase in Debt/GDP). We provide evidence that the stock of debt aﬀects the
interest rates on government bonds. But it is important to note that the eﬀect we identify is on the spread
between government interest rates and corporate interest rates. It is possible that Ricardian equivalence
fails in a way that government debt has an eﬀect on the general level of interest rates, both corporate and
government. Since we focus on spreads, we are unable to isolate such an eﬀect. On the other hand, as we
focus on spreads, we can be certain that the eﬀect we identify on government interest rates is over and above
any possible eﬀects of government debt on the general level of interest rates. From an empirical standpoint,
the advantage of focusing on spreads rather than the level of interest rates is that the spread measure is
unaﬀected by other shocks (such as changes in expected inﬂation) that aﬀect the level of interest rates and
complicate inference. We also bypass endogeneity issues stemming from government behavior, since it is
unlikely that the government chooses debt levels based on the corporate bond spread.
At a broad level, our evidence is consistent with theories that ascribe a unique value to government debt.
Bansal and Coleman (1996) present a theory in which debt, but not equity claims, are money-like and carry
a convenience value. They argue that the theory can account for the high average equity premium and low
average risk-free rate in the US.4 Our ﬁnding of a unique value provided by government debt relative to
private debt support theories such as Woodford (1990), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), and Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2006). In these papers, the government’s credibility gives its securities unique collateral and
liquidity features relative to private assets and thereby induces a premium on government assets.
4Aiyagari and Gertler (1990), Heaton and Lucas (1996), and Vayanos and Vila (1999) present general equilibrium models
in which an illiquid asset (i.e. stocks) carries a transaction cost while a liquid asset (bonds) do not. In equilibrium, the liquid
asset has a liquidity premium over the illiquid asset. Eisfeldt (2006) studies whether the liquidity premium between short term
bonds and longer term bonds can by rationalized in a calibrated consumption smoothing model, ﬁnding that it cannot.
52 The Convenience Yield on Treasury Securities
We articulate the convenience yield theory in the context of a representative agent asset-pricing model. We
price securities at date t that mature at date t+τ. The agent chooses holdings of these securities to maximize
utility:
u(ct)+βτu(ct+τ).
The Euler equation for the agent pins down the prices of assets at date t. For a riskless Treasury bond that
pays one unit of consumption at date t + τ,
P T
t = E [mt+τ],m t+τ ≡ βτ u (ct+τ)
u (ct)
.
mt+τ is the τ-period pricing kernel in the economy. For a corporate bond with face value of one and
repayment 1+DC
t+τ (where DC
t+τ = 0 in the absence of default and DC
t+τ < 0 if there is default on the bond)





















as the yields on the corporate and Treasury bonds. These formula convert the price of a zero coupon bond


























The approximation going from the ﬁrst to second line uses the relation that ln(1 + x) ≈ x for small x.F o r
high grade corporate and government debt on which interest rates are low, bond prices may be close to one.
Although it is clear that the approximation is imperfect in some circumstances, we make the approximation
















as the “C-CAPM” value of the spread between corporate bonds and Treasury bonds. The spread has two
components.5
5There is a third component in the spread of equation(1) that arises if we consider the diﬀerentialtax treatment of corporate
and Treasury bonds. We discuss the tax component in Section 8.2.
6The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side reﬂects the expected losses due to default on corporate bonds
(“default risk”). Higher expected defaults leads to a higher yield spread. The second term on the right hand
side reﬂects the economic “risk premium” attached to default states. Depending on how default covaries
with the marginal utility of the representative agent, default may carry an additional risk premium.
We next modify this model to introduce a convenience value of Treasury securities. We observe that
Treasury securities oﬀer unique services to agents in the economy. As noted in the introduction, some agents
are motivated to buy Treasuries for liquidity reasons, some for neutrality reasons, and others for the surety
that Treasuries oﬀer. These motives will be reﬂected in the aggregate demand for Treasury securities. We
use the word “convenience” value to encompass the many motives for holding Treasuries. Section 5 of the
paper oﬀers microeconomic evidence on the diﬀerent sources of convenience demand.
The convenience demand theory is analogous to theories of money demand. Agents hold money despite
the fact that it is a dominated asset because it oﬀers unique liquidity services. At any point in time, the
convenience yield on money can be inferred from the overnight federal funds rate, since that is the price at
which an agent can obtain the services of money for one day. Similarly, we argue that the convenience yield
on Treasury securities can be inferred from asset prices.
We modify the representative agent utility function to include a term whereby the agent receives utility
from his Treasury holdings:
u(ct)+βτu(ct+τ)+v(θT
t ;Xt).
v(·) reﬂects the unique services provided by Treasury securities, with v (·) > 0a n dv  (·) < 0. θT
t is the
agent’s holdings of Treasury debt and Xt are some of the factors that might aﬀect the valuation. This
modiﬁcation is similar to monetary models with money in the utility function.
For this modiﬁed model,
P
T


























As in equation (1), the yield spread has a default risk component and a risk premium component. Since
Treasury securities are also assumed to provide a convenience value, the bond spread is increased by a
convenience yield.
Note that if v (·) is equal to zero the yield spread corresponds exactly to our previous C-CAPM yield
spread. The introduction of convenience valuation widens the yield spread (last term).
For simplicity we rewrite the convenience yield term as follows. Since the factors (Xt)t h a ta ﬀ e c tt h e
convenience valuation, v (·), may include time t variables such as u (ct), for brevity, we do not divide v (·)




t + v (θT
t ;Xt)
The yield spread characterizes the agent’s demand function for Treasury debt. If the US government supplies
ΘT
t of debt, then the equilibrium spread we should observe in the market is:
∆∗
t + v (ΘT
t ;Xt)( 3 )
We refer to ∆∗
t as the “default” component of the corporate bond spread, and v (·) as the “non-default”
component of the corporate bond spread. Recall from (1) that the default component includes both a default
risk component as well as a risk premium component.
Figure 2 represents the equilibrium spread determination graphically. The marginal valuationof Treasury
securities is reﬂected in the downward sloping function D(θT
t ;Xt)=∆ ∗
t +v (θT
t ;Xt). This valuation is always
at least ∆∗
t, the C-CAPM value of the spread. At the margin, the valuationdecreases as the agent holds more
Treasury debt. The supply of Treasury debt is represented by the vertical line at ΘT
t . In the convenience
yield model the spread falls as ΘT
t rises.
3 Estimation
Our baseline regressions involve the time series of the bond yield spread (the yield on corporate bonds minus
the yield on Treasuries) as the dependent variable and the log of ratio of the stock of US government debt
to US GDP as the independent variable, along with a number of controls we discuss below. Our convenience
yield theory implies that the coeﬃcient on (log) government Debt/GDP in this regression will be negative.
The main diﬃculty with interpreting such a regression is that changes in ΘT
t /GDPt may be correlated
with changes in ∆∗
t, so that the regression of the bond spread on log(ΘT
t /GDPt) may yield a signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient, despite there being no causal relation running from ΘT
t /GDPt to the spread. For example,
suppose that the true model is the C-CAPM, but increases in ΘT
t /GDPt are correlated with decreases in
∆∗
t. Then, we will ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient on log(ΘT
t /GDPt) despite there being no convenience yield on
Treasuries.
There are two principal sources of such a correlation. Our primary concern is an omitted variable bias. If
there is an economic shock that causes the government to increase ΘT
t and that also causes corporate default
risk to fall or the default risk premium charged by investors to fall, and our regressions do not control for
6To motivate this simpliﬁcation, note that if ct/GDPt is constant across time, then u (ct) can be written as a function of
GDPt. In our regressions we include GDPt as one of the Xt regressors. In the data the ratio ct/GDPt is relatively stable over
time.
8Figure 2: Bond Spread and Total Debt
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The ﬁgure graphically illustrates the equilibrium determination of the spread between Treasury
bond yields and corporate bond yields. The downward sloping curve is the demand for Treasury
securities as a function of the spread in our convenience yield model. In the neoclassical C-CAPM
model, this demand function is completely elastic at the representative agent’s risk prices. The
horizontal dashed line in the ﬁgure corresponds to the C-CAPM demand. The supply of Treasury
securities is represented by the vertical line at Θ
T
t . We assume that the government does not choose
the stock of debt in response to the bond spread; hence the supply curve is inelastic.
this shock, then our estimates will be biased.7,8
The solid line in Figure 3 plots the US Debt/GDP ratio from 1925 to 2005. The two main forces behind
changes in the Debt/GDP ratio are wars and the business cycle (see Bohn (1998)). From the ﬁgure we see
7The spread, ∆∗
t could also fall if government debt becomes more risky when ΘT
t rises, holding the risk of corporate debt
ﬁxed. This seems implausible on a priori grounds. The government can always print money to pay oﬀ its debt. While this
possible action may lead to (expected) inﬂation and thereby raise the interest rate on government debt, it will lead to an equal
rise in the interest rate on corporate debt and no eﬀect on our spread measure.
8A related concern with our estimation has to do with interpreting the coeﬃcient on log(ΘT
t /GDPt) as the slope of agents’
demand curve. That is, suppose that consistent with our convenience yield theory, the true demand curve for Treasuries is
downward sloping. If there is a correlation between shifts in demand (Xt) and shifts in supply (ΘT
t )t h a ti sn o ta d e q u a t e l y
controlled for, the coeﬃcient on ΘT
t will be a biased estimate of the slope of agents’ demand curve. We deal with this issue in
the regressions by controlling for demand shocks and presenting instrumental variables regressions.
9that the Debt/GDP ratio rises during the Great Depression starting in 1930 and going through the mid-
1930s. The ratio rises again during the WWII period. The peacetime expansion beginning in 1950 gradually
reduces the Debt/GDP ratio until about 1980 when the Reagan military build up expands the ratio again.
Through the 1990s the ratio falls as the economy expands again. The ratio rises again starting in 2001,
coincident with 9/11 and recessionary conditions. Thus, broadly speaking, war spending and recessions
increase the Debt/GDP ratio, while expansions reduce the ratio.
We note that, a priori, a negative economic shock that causes the government to increase the debt stock
is more likely to increase than decrease ∆∗
t, so that the omitted variable bias may be less of a problem for
our regressions.
Empirically we deal with the omitted variable bias in three ways. First, we introduce controls that
attempt to directly capture variation in ∆∗
t. We include corporate sector credit risk variables and business
cycle measures that may control for changes in default risk and default risk premia. We also include standard
controls for changes in marketwide risk premia such as the slope of the yield curve. Second, we present
regressions where the dependent variable is the realized excess return on corporate bonds over government
bonds (as opposed to the yield spread). Since return realizations encompass default-related events such
as corporate bond downgrades, the return series will not be aﬀected by the default risk term in (2). In
these regressions, we also include proxies for marketwide risk premia to control for the risk premium in the
corporate bond returns. Last, we study disaggregated data where we present evidence consistent with our
theory based on instrumental variables regressions.
The second source of correlation in our setting arises because government behavior may both cause
changes in the Debt/GDP ratio and the corporate bond spread. Suppose that a shock that we have not
controlled for causes the government to spend resources (or lower taxes) in a way that increases the revenues
of the corporate sector and raises the Debt/GDP ratio, then the default risk premium component ∆∗
t will
fall when ΘT
t rises. We deal with this concern as an omitted variable bias, and as explained above.
Finally, note that the usual reverse causality concern that government behavior is an endogenous response
to a change in prices is less of a concern in our setting because the price variable is a corporate bond spread.
The US government is unlikely to choose the stock of outstanding debt in response to a change in the
default risk of corporate bonds relative to Treasuries. It seems plausible that the government’s decision may
respond to a change in the level of interest rates, but not a change in default spreads. Indeed, this is why
we represent the supply curve in Figure 2 as a vertical line. Our use of interest rate spreads rather than the
level of interest rates to discern the eﬀects of government debt policy avoids a number of diﬃcult issues that
prior work testing Ricardian equivalence has had to contend with.
104 Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt
We adopt the following functional form in the regressions. We assume that v (·) can be written as:
v (ΘT
t ;Xt)=A + Bl o g(ΘT
t /GDPt), where B<0.
The demand for Treasury debt should increase as the economy becomes larger. That is, as the economy grows,
there is greater demand for Treasury securities for liquidity purposes, there are more oﬃcial transactions
involving Treasury securities, and there are more unsophisticated households seeking savings vehicles. We
scale the stock of Treasuries by US GDP to measure this demand eﬀect.
The log function reﬂects that the marginal convenience valuation decreases more slowly as ΘT
t increases,
consistent with Figure 2. In contrast to our convenience yield theory, the log speciﬁcation implies that v 
may become negative. However, this only happens in two of the years we analyze (1945 and 1946 when
the US Debt/GDP ratio is above one).9 We adopt the log function primarily so that the coeﬃcient, B,
can be interpreted as the semi-elasticity of the bond spread with respect to the stock of debt. We present
regressions based on an exponential speciﬁcation where v  is always positive in Section 5. Over the range of
variation of the Debt/GDP ratio, the results from the exponential speciﬁcations are almost identical to the
log speciﬁcation.
The linear regressions we present are thus for the relation:
St = A + Bl o g(ΘT
t /GDPt)+CY t +  t (4)
using St as a time series of bond yield spreads, ΘT
t as the book value of publicly held Treasury debt, with
controls for other factors (Yt) that aﬀect the C-CAPM value of the spread. We are centrally interested in
estimating the semi-elasticity B.
Note that we use the book value of Treasury debt rather than market value because our equilibrium
relation, (3), expresses prices (the spread) as a function of quantities (book value of Treasury debt). If we
were to use the market value of Treasury debt, the quantity measure would also reﬂect market prices.
4.1 Corporate Bond Spread
Figure 3 graphs the percentage spread between the Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yield and the average
yield on long maturity (> 10 years) Treasury bonds. Both data series are from the Federal Reserve’s FRED
database and extend from 1925 to 2005 in the ﬁgure. The Moody’s index is constructed from a sample of
long maturity (> 10 years) industrial and utility bonds. The Treasury yield is available from 1925 - 1999,
9Omitting these years leads to slightly stronger results, i.e. a steeper relation between the bond yield spread and the
Debt/GDP ratio. See Section 8.
11while the Moody’s AAA yield is available from 1919 - 2005.10 We use the yield on 20 year maturity Treasury
bonds for 2000 - 2005.11
The ﬁgure also graphs the Debt/GDP ratio in the US over the same period. The Debt/GDP ratio for
years up to 2003 are downloaded from Henning Bohn’s website. The data series is updated until 2005 from
the Oﬃce of Management and Budget. Bohn constructs the measure as the ratio of privately held Treasury
debt (from the WEFA database, Federal Reserve Banking and Monetary Statistics, and recent issues of the
Economic Report to the President) relative to either GDP (after 1959) or GNP (prior to 1959). Privately
held debt includes debt held by the Federal Reserve, but excludes debt held by other parts of the government
such as the Social Security Trust Fund. In Section 8 we present results where we construct privately held
debt by also excluding the Federal Reserve’s debt holdings. The robustness check is for the period after 1945
when we can break out the Federal Reserve holdings.





















The corporate bond yield spread (left y-axis) and Debt/GDP ratio (right y-axis)
are graphed from 1925 to 2005. The corporate bond yield spread is the percentage
diﬀerence between the yield on Moody’s AAA bond index and the yield on long
maturity Treasury bonds.
10The corporate bond and Treasury bond yields are for coupon bonds, not zero-coupon bonds, as derived in our simpliﬁed
theory.
11While both the Moody’s AAA yield and Treasury yield correspond to bonds with approximately 20 year maturities, there
may be mismatch in the exact maturities between the bonds. We add a covariate measuring the slope of the yield curve to
control for the maturity mismatch eﬀect.
12Figures 1 and 3 suggest that there is a negative correlation between the bond yield spread and the stock
of Treasury debt. Table I presents regressions relating the yield spread between AAA rated corporate bonds
and Treasury securities, and the log US Debt/GDP ratio. Column (1) of the table conﬁrms the statistical
signiﬁcance of the relation suggested by Figures 1 and 3. The coeﬃcient of -0.77 implies that a one standard
deviation (0.42) increase in log(Debt/GDP) reduces the bond yield spread by 32 basis points.
As noted above, the default risk on corporate bonds varies with the state of the economy. This variation
also aﬀects the corporate bond spread (∆∗
t in the theoretical framework). We control for default risk using
the spread between the Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yields, which measures the
relative default risk of lower and higher grade corporate bonds. We rationalize using this spread to measure
default risk by noting that if default risk of the corporate sector rises, or the risk premium investors demand
for absorbing default risk rises, one would expect to see an increase in the yield spread between higher and
lower grade corporate bonds. Thus the BAA-AAA spread will capture time variation in corporate default
risk as well as time variation in the market price of default risk (equation (1)). The Moody’s BAA series is
from the Federal Reserve’s FRED database.
As expected, the default risk variable is signiﬁcant and positively related to the corporate bond spread
(column (2)). However, adding the control does not alter the importance of log(Debt/GDP) much. Table
XI of Section 8 reports regressions that include some other measures of corporate default risk.
We include the slope of the yield curve, measured as the spread between the 10 year Treasury yield and
the 3 month Treasury yield (slope), to further control for the economic risk premium component of ∆∗
t.T h e
interest rate on Treasuries with three month maturity is from FRED from 1934 to 2005 and from the NBER
macro data base prior to that. The interest rate on Treasuries with ten year maturity is from FRED from
1953 to 2005 and from the NBER macro data base prior to that.
The slope of the yield curve can measure the state of the business cycle and is known to predict the
excess returns on stocks. For example, if investors are more risk averse in a recession, when the slope is high,
they will demand a higher risk premium to hold corporate bonds. Thus, slope serves as a second measure of
variation in ∆∗
t. We also note that to the extent that corporate default risk is likely to vary with the business
cycle, the slope variable can also control for the default risk component of ∆∗
t. The regression is reported in
column (3) of the Table and results in similar coeﬃcient estimates on the log(Debt/GDP) variable. We have
also run speciﬁcations that include the price/earnings ratio on the stock market to measure investor risk
aversion. The inclusion of this control does not alter our ﬁndings. The results are available upon request.
The results reported in Panel A of the table are OLS time series regressions. Because the underlying
series are persistent, the regression residuals are autocorrelated. All of the regressions report t-statistics
based on Newey-West robust standard errors that allow for ﬁrst order autocorrelation. Panel B presents our
ﬁnal speciﬁcations, where we assume that the regressions residuals are AR(1) and use a GLS approach to
13obtain more eﬃcient estimates. Speciﬁcally, the regressions are Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) iterated regressions.
They conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Panel A.
Table I-B presents similar regressions to those reported in Table I-A, but using a one year corporate
to Treasury spread as dependent variable, rather than the approximately 20 year spread of Table I-A. The
dependent variable is constructed using commercial paper (CP) and Treasury bills data.12
The results reported are in line with those of Table I-A. Increases in log(Debt/GDP) decrease the CP-Bill
yield spread. This result holds across all of our speciﬁcations.13
The coeﬃcient estimates of the semi-elasticity and the regression R2s are smaller for the CP-Bill yield
spread regressions than the long term corporate bond yield spread regressions. We think this occurs because
CP is more liquid relative to T-bills than AAA corporate bonds are relative to Treasury bonds. The lower
R2s may also be due to the CP-Bill spread moving at a higher frequency than the Debt/GDP ratios. Changes
in the riskiness of corporate cash-ﬂows may have larger eﬀects on a short-term credit spread than a long
term credit spread. Note that the coeﬃcient on BAA−AAA is larger in these regressions than in the earlier
ones. For these reasons, we concentrate on the long term corporate bond yield spreads in the rest of the
paper.
Our results imply that an important part of the corporate bond spread is due to variation in the supply
of Treasury securities, suggesting that the corporate bond spread has a signiﬁcant “non-default” component.
This result accords with some evidence from the ﬁnance literature on corporate bond pricing. In a recent
analysis of corporate bonds using prices from the credit-default swap market, Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis
(2005) conclude that the default component is important, but does not account for the entire corporate
spread. They ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant nondefault component ranging from about 20 to 100 bps depending
12We calculate an annual CP-Bills spread by annualizing 3-month yields, sampled quarterly, for the period 1972-2005 and
annualizing 6-month yields, sampled semiannually, from 1921-1971. We annualize the yields by rolling over the investment
at the end of each 3-month period (or end of each 6-month period prior to 1972) at the then prevailing yields. The speciﬁc
data series used are as follows: The commercial paper data from 1972 to 2005 is from Global Insight, “INTEREST RATE:
COMMERCIAL PAPER, 3-MONTH ( PER ANNUM,NSA).” From 1921 to 1971 we use 6-month commercial paper data from
John Campbell’s web page (see page 8 of http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/∼campbell/papers/dataapp.pdf). The T-Bill data
from 1972 to 2005 is from FRED’s “3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate.” From 1959 to 1971 the T-Bill data is
from FRED’s “6-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate”. From 1931-1958 the T-Bill data are from the NBER’s series
“U.S. Yields On Short-Term United States Securities, Three-Six Month Treasury Notes and Certiﬁcates, Three Month Treasury
01/1931-11/1969”, and for 1921-1930 the T-Bill data are from the NBER’s series “U. S. Yields On Short-Term United States
Securities, Three-Six Month Treasury Notes and Certiﬁcates, Three Month Treasury 01/1920-03/1934.”
13Commercial paper is not callable, while long-term corporate bonds are typically callable. Thus, the CP-Bills spread does
not have a call option component as does the long term corporate bond yield spread. Moreover, the maturity of commercial
paper and T-Bills can be exactly matched, while there may be some maturity mismatch between the Moody’s AAA bond yield
and the long term Treasury bond yield. It is encouraging that our results hold for the CP-Bills spread suggesting that the call
option and maturity mismatch factors are not responsible for the correlation we document.
14upon the bond. Other recent papers in the literature reach similar conclusions (see, for example, Elton et al
(2001), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), or Huang and Huang (2001)). Our results not only
conﬁrm the existence of a non-default component over a long time period, but tie this non-default component
to the supply of Treasury securities.
4.2 Swap Spread
The literature on interest rate swaps has prominently raised the possibility that there may be a convenience
yield on Treasury securities (see Duﬃe and Singleton (1997), Grinblatt (2001), He (2001), Liu, Longstaﬀ,
and Mandell (2004), Li (2004), and Feldhutter and Lando (2005)).
Figure 4 graphs the 10-year US Dollar swap spread and the negative of the log(Debt/GDP)r a t i oo v e r
the period from 1987 to 2005. The data is from Global Financial Data (series ISUSA10D). The 10-year US
Dollar swap spread is the diﬀerence between the ﬁxed rate in a 10-year ﬁxed-for-ﬂoating interest rate swap
and the yield on 10-year Treasury notes. We switch the sign on log(Debt/GDP) following on our previous
results that the two series are negatively correlated. The ﬁgure conﬁrms the evidence reported in Figure 3
and Table I, albeit for a shorter, more recent, period.

























































































The 10-year interest rate swap spread (left y-axis)and −log(Debt/GDP)r a t i o
(right y-axis) are graphed from 1987 to 2005. The swap spread is monthly and
measured as a percentage, while the Debt/GDP ratio is annual.
A 10-year interest rate swap is a string of forward contracts between today (s = t)a n ds = t+10 years.
15The payment on date s is equal to Rs − ˜ rs,w h e r eRs is the ﬁxed interest rate known as the 10 year swap
rate, and ˜ rs is a variable interest rate that is set at a date just prior to date s. The variable or ﬂoating
interest rate is indexed to LIBOR, and the reset frequency as well as the frequency of swap payments can
range from overnight to one-year. A typical swap contract may be indexed to 3-month LIBOR and require
payments every 3 months for 10 years.
The LIBOR rate itself reﬂects the borrowing rate for a AA rated ﬁnancial institution. Thus, ignoring the
uncertainty in the realized path of LIBOR rates for the next 10 years, the 10 year swap rate (Rs) is roughly
equal to the 10 year interest rate at which a ﬁnancial institution that is sure to be AA rated for the next
10 years will borrow (Collin-Dufresne and Solnik (2001)). LIBOR rates are typically slightly higher than
Federal Funds rates and the borrowing rates on short-term collateralized loans (the repo rate).
Using sophisticated pricing models that incorporate estimates of default rates as well as risk premia due
to the uncertainty in realized LIBOR rates, the current literature ﬁnds that there is a large unexplained
component of the swap spread (see Duﬃe and Singleton (1997), Grinblatt (2001), He (2001), Liu, Longstaﬀ,
and Mandell (2004), Li (2004), and Feldhutter and Lando (2005)). Feldhutter and Lando (2005), studying
a sample from 1997 to 2003, ﬁnd that the default component of swap spreads averages around 40 bps.H e
(2001) notes that the spread between LIBOR rates and repo rates average between 15 and 25 bps, occasionally
reaching highs of 40 bps. As one can see in Figure 4, swap spreads are typically much higher than 40 bps.
Thus, the weight of evidence in the interest rate swap literature points to a substantial nondefault component
in the swap spread.
Table II presents results analogousto Table I, but using the 10-year interest rate swap spread as dependent
variable. We note that these results are for only 19 data points, so their importance should be weighted
accordingly. In the majority of the speciﬁcations, the results point to a signiﬁcant role for the supply of
Treasury securities as a driver of swap spreads.14 Note also that the coeﬃcient on the credit risk variable
(BAA − AAA spread) is barely signiﬁcant, and has the wrong sign in Panel B. This result accords with
the existing literature which ﬁnds only a secondary role for default risk in swap spreads. The magnitudes
on log(Debt/GDP) are larger in many of the swap spread regressions as compared to the corporate bond
spread regressions. These results suggests that the swap spread, since it is less aﬀected by other factors, may
be an ideal measure of the value investors assign to Treasury securities.15
14Our ﬁnding that the aggregate supply of Treasury securities aﬀects the swap spread is distinct from the ﬁnding of Johannes
and Sundaresan (2006) that collateralization requirements on individual swap counterparties aﬀects the prices of swaps.
15Like the CP-Bills spread, the interest rate swap spread is an exact maturity match and has no call option component. That
our results hold for the swap spread is further support that our results are not driven by a spurious correlation.
164.3 Bond Returns
In this subsection we present regressions using the realized return on corporate bonds relative to Treasury
bonds as dependent variable. By using realized returns we bypass any problems arising from the fact that
the corporate bond yield spread partly reﬂects the default risk of corporate issuers. That is, since return
realizations encompass default events, including corporate bond downgrades, they only measure the eco-
nomic risk premium and the non-default component of the relative pricing of corporate bonds and Treasury
securities. However, this measure does come at a cost: realizations are random, and thus realized excess
returns are a noisy estimate of the non-default component.
Table III-A presents regressions relating the realized excess returns to the ex-ante yield spread between
corporate and Treasury bonds. The dependent variable in the Table III regressions is the percentage excess
return on long term corporate bonds over long term government bonds, at one, three, and ﬁve year horizons.
The return data are from Ibottson, and are annual, beginning in 1926 and ending in 2004. The Ibbotson
corporate bond index is based on the total return from holding high grade (typically AAA and AA) corporate
bonds with approximately a 20-year maturity. AAAs and AAs almost never default over the next year. The
default-events in holding these bonds is that the probability of default rises (for example, downgrades) and
the bonds deliver a low return. The latter is the relevant default risk in holding high grade corporate bonds
over a short period. If a bond is downgraded during a particular month, Ibbotson includes its return for
that month in the computation of the index return before removing the bond from future portfolios.
In addition to the corporate bond spread, we include the slope of the yield curve as independent variable.
slope captures the state of the business cycle, and any possible time variation in investor risk aversion that
may drive expected returns on risky assets. The results conﬁrm that the bond yield spread predicts future
excess returns, and is thereby not purely reﬂective of default considerations. These results support our use
of the bond spread as dependent variable in the prior regressions.
Table III-B presents regressions analogous to Table I, but using the realized excess return (rather than
the corporate bond yield spread) as dependent variable. Relative to Table III-A, we consider two additional
independent variables. durationhedge is the realized returns on long term government bonds over short
term bonds, and is meant to capture any possible biases due to diﬀerences in duration of the underlying
corporate bonds and Treasury bonds. We also include the standard four factor controls (market, HML,
SMB, momentum) to proxy for other risk factors driving asset returns.16
16The fact that corporate bonds oﬀer a higher return than Treasury bonds raises the standard arbitrage question of why an
investor who has no convenience demand for Treasuries does not short Treasuries and purchase corporate bonds, and thereby
eliminate the return diﬀerential. To engage in this transaction, the arbitrageur needs to borrow Treasury securities through a
repurchase agreement and short the bonds. He borrows Treasury bonds, leaving cash with the bond lender to cover the value
of the Treasury security, and then sells the bonds in the market (see Krishnamurthy, 2002, for a description of the repurchase
market). Note that the cash proceeds from the short must be left with the bond lender as security for borrowing the bonds,
17The results largely accord with our previous ﬁndings. The log(Debt/GDP) ratio is negatively related
to realized returns. Our strongest results are at the three-year and ﬁve-year horizons. This may reﬂect
that the Debt/GDP ratio picks up low frequency movements in the convenience yield on Treasury securities.
The magnitudes reported for the semi-elasticity are also in line with our previous ﬁndings. If we divide the
coeﬃcient estimate on log(Debt/GDP) of Table III-B by the coeﬃcient estimates on AAA−Treasury from
Table III-A (to convert back into yield equivalents), we arrive at numbers around −1 which are similar to
estimates from previous tables.
4.4 Treasury Substitutes
Our results so far suggest that the demand curve for Treasury securities is downward sloping, consistent with
Figure 1 and 2. We argue that this is because investors assign a convenience value to Treasury securities
which lowers their yield relative to corporate securities with similar cashﬂow properties, and this value rises
as the stock of Treasury debt falls.
As the stock of Treasury debt falls, we would expect that investors substitute some of their demand into
other low risk securities that may oﬀer some, but perhaps not all, of the convenience service of Treasury
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corporate bonds and agency debt. Then, as θT
t falls, agents will bid up the price of substitute securities.
We present results consistent with this prediction based on corporate bonds. Our regressions do not exploit
changes in the supply of corporate debt – such changes are likely to be endogenous to the corporate bond
spread – but only exploit changes in the supply of Treasury debt.17
In Table IV-A, we use the BAA-AAA yield spread as the dependent variable and regress this measure
against log(Debt/GDP) with various controls. Note that these regressions do not control for default risk,
but as we have seen in earlier regressions, the results are not altered by the inclusion of a default risk control.
In Table IV-B, we redo our main regressions but now use the BAA − Treasury spread as dependent
variable. Since the results of Table IV-A suggest that the AAA rate is also aﬀected by changes in the
and cannot be used to directly purchase corporate bonds. To go long the corporate bonds, the arbitrageur must purchase a
corporate bond, borrowing cash against the corporate bond in the repurchase market. There are limits to carrying out this
arbitrage. First, the repo market on corporate bonds is quite limited, involving large capital requirements and expensive repo
rates. Moreover, the arbitrageur will also have to post capital in order to short the Treasury bonds. Together these obstacles
will limit carrying out the arbitrageur’s strategy.
17We can add the ratio of corporate debt to GDP as regressor to investigatehow it correlates with the corporate bond spread.
We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on this covariate is small and not statistically signiﬁcant.
18supply of Treasury debt, the regressions using the AAA − Treasury spreads underestimate the slope of the
Treasury demand curve. Consistent with this statement, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient estimates in Table IV-B
are roughly twice as large as those reported in Table I-A.
5D e m a n d C u r v e s , b y G r o u p
Using a variety of measures, we have shown that the aggregate demand curve for Treasury debt is downward
sloping. We have argued that the demand curve is not perfectly elastic because Treasury securities provide
a convenience service. We next turn to analyzing disaggregated data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of
the Federal Reserve to shed some light on the sources of this convenience demand. We ﬁrst argue that
diﬀerent groups of Treasury owners likely have diﬀerent motives for holding Treasuries. We then estimate
which groups have the least elastic demand curves in order to determine which of the various motives are
likely to contribute substantially to the convenience yield on Treasuries.
5.1 Who Holds Treasury Debt and Why?
Table V presents statistics on the fraction of Treasury securities held by diﬀerent groups in the economy.
The data are from Table L.209 in the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve. They are annual from
1945 to 1951. From 1952 onwards the data are quarterly, and we use the values for the end of the second
quarter. Table V presents the average fraction of Treasury holdings across these years.18
The mean holdings reported in the second column gives a rough idea of which groups are important in
setting the prices of Treasury securities. There are two groups with strong trends, for which the means are
misleading. The Foreign Oﬃcial Holdings (i.e. central banks) category is an important recent holder of
Treasury securities. This group’s holdings rise in 1971 with the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system.
The maximum holding of 0.29 is in 2005. The Banks/Credit Institutions group has its maximum holdings of
0.42 in 1945, which subsequently decreases in the 1950s and 1960s. The Fed-Treasury Accord (Wicker, 1969)
incentivized banks to hold Treasury securities during World War II because the Fed, in pegging Treasury
interest rates, had agreed to allow the private sector to freely exchange Treasury securities for reserves.
We oﬀer three motives behind the Treasury holdings, reﬂected diﬀerently across the groups in Table V.
First, a number of observers have noted the superior liquidity of Treasury securities over other assets such
as corporate bonds. For example, Reinhart and Sack (2000) note that bid-oﬀer spreads on corporate bonds
18For simplicity, Table V omits a few small categories of Treasury owners. The omitted categories are nonﬁnancial corporate
business, nonfarm noncorporate business, Federal government retirement funds (for whom reported holdings of Treasuries are
zero up to 1986), government-sponsored enterprises, and brokers and dealers. The total share of Treasuries owned jointly by
these groups averages 4.8% with a maximum of 8.9% and a minimum of 1.3%
19are four to six times larger than those of Treasury bonds. Krishnamurthy (2002) shows that the spread
between commercial paper and Treasury bills is highly correlated with the spread between more and less
liquid Treasury securities. Krishnamurthy suggests that the comovement in spreads reﬂects economy-wide
variation in agents’ desire to hold liquid securities. Changes in agents’ demand for liquidity drives both the
liquidity spreads within the Treasury market as well as the spread between less liquid commercial paper
and Treasury securities. These observations suggest that a liquidity motive is an important factor driving
Treasury holdings. Managers of large reserve positions (foreign central banks, Federal Reserve banks) and
those with short-term liquidity needs (households, banks and credit institutions) are likely to purchase
Treasuries because of their superior liquidity. Banks and credit institutions also face capital requirements
that favor the liquidity/low risk of Treasury securities over other assets.
Second, Kohn (2005) notes that Treasury securities best satisfy the Federal Reserve’s portfolio objective
of “liquidity, safety, and neutrality in private credit allocation.” A neutrality motive is important for govern-
mental holders of Treasury securities (including foreign central banks and state/local governments). Were
these entities to invest in private assets, questions arise about which particular private assets to choose, the
possibility of sub-optimal speculation/ mis-management arises, etc. Thus, an implicit mandate of avoiding
investments in private assets may be in the best interests of taxpayers for these governmental entities.
Third, Treasury securities carry a halo of surety that may motivate the holdings of some groups. For
example, unsophisticated households who are unable to assess the risk in corporate assets may be drawn to
Treasuries by a surety motive (see Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002, on costs that may limit household participation
in the stock market). The same motivemay apply to some of the foreign private sector’s demand for Treasury
securities. Desiring to hold assets in US Dollars, some foreign investors may choose to hold the dollars in
the form of Treasury securities rather than corporate assets.
State/local retirement funds, private pensions, and insurance companies are an interesting group for our
analysis. Since these groups have a long-term objective and no explicit regulatory requirements, the liquidity
and neutrality motives are unlikely to be important for them. Comparing the demands of groups that are
driven by liquidity and neutrality motives (i.e. oﬃcial groups, banks, and households) to that of the long-
term investors provides a gauge as to the importance of the liquidity and neutrality motives. As we show
below, we ﬁnd that the long-term investor groups have the most elastic demand curves (as well as smallest
mean holdings from Table V). This points us to the conclusion that the liquidity and neutrality motives are
the primary determinants of the convenience yield.
It is diﬃcult to say exactly why state/local retirement funds, private pensions, and insurance companies
hold any Treasuries at all. One possibility is that the surety motive applies indirectly to these groups.
Insurance companies’ business depends on the perception by their customers of a stable balance sheet. If
these customers think that balance sheet stability is enhanced by holdings of Treasury securities, insurance
20companies may demand Treasuries. A similar argument can be applied to the retirement saving groups who
make deﬁned beneﬁt promises to their claimants.
Our strategy in this section is to estimate demand curves for each of the groups of Table V. We assume
that group-i’s demand can be expressed in the same log-linear functional form as earlier speciﬁcations:
St = Ai + Bilog(θi
t/GDPt)+Ci Yt +  i,t. (5)
We are interested in estimating Bi, the demand elasticity for group-i. The demand elasticities can help to
shed light on which of the groups – and indirectly, which of the motives – are important in determining the
convenience yield.
5.2 IV Using Total Stock of Debt
In equilibrium, shocks to group i’s demand will aﬀect both the spread and group i’s holdings. This implies
that in (5) both St and θi
t are endogenous and correlated with  i,t. Thus, we cannot estimate Bi in (5) using
OLS and need an instrument to proceed. As we explain next, we use the total stock of Treasury debt as an
instrument.
We rewrite (5) to express the quantity as a function of price:
log(θi
t/GDPt)=αi + βiSt + γiYt + ei,t,
where the constants are deﬁned appropriately and ei,t = − i,t/Bi. Summing the left and right hand side of








































Because we have assumed a log-linear demand curve for each group, the left hand side of (6) involves the
product of each of the group’s holdings of Treasuries. However, if we make the approximation that the



















we can rewrite (6) as
St = A + Bl o g (Θ
T
t /GDPt)+CY t + D
	
ei,t. (7)
21A,B,C, and D are functions of the sums of the demand coeﬃcients across the groups.19 The approximation
error involved becomes larger if the holdings are more dissimilar across groups. If we use the mean holdings
of each group from Table V, the geometric average is 10.6% and the arithmetic average is 8.0%.
Equation (7) is the demand curve we have estimated in earlier sections. The derivation makes clear that
St is indeed a function of ei,t (and  i,t), consistent with our earlier remark about needing an instrument. If
we assume that changes in the stock of Treasury debt (ΘT
t ) are not correlated with unobserved shifts ( i,t)
in a group’s demand for Treasury bonds, beyond the controls of our regressions, then ΘT
t can be used as
instrument to estimate equation (5). In words, shifts in the total stock of debt shift the supply curve facing
group-i, and can thereby be used to trace out group-i’s demand curve.
We use two stage least squares (2SLS), instrumenting log(θi
t/GDPt)w i t hlog(ΘT
t /GDPt). In the ﬁrst
stage we regress log(θi
t/GDPt)o nlog(ΘT
t /GDPt)a n dYt. We use the ﬁtted values to estimate the group’s
demand curve:
St = Ai + Bi  log(Θi
t/GDPt)+Ci Yt +  i,t. (8)
Table VI presents estimates of the semi-elasticity Bi for each of the groups. The controls (Yt)i nt h i s
regression include the BAA − AAA spread and slope. We also include a time trend as a control in these
regressions because the holdings for many of the groups contain strong trends (the foreign oﬃcial holders
and banks/credit institutions as noted above). Finally, note that the sample period for these regressions
begins in 1945, because the group holdings data is from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve,
which are only available beginning in 1945.
There is a clear ranking in the demand elasticities across the categories. Groups like Private Pensions
and Insurance Companies have much more elastic demand curves than groups like Federal Reserve Banks,
Foreign Oﬃcial Holdings or State/Local Governments. The former groups make larger changes in their
holdings of Treasury securities in response to a change in the corporate bond spread generated by a shift in
the total supply of Treasuries. In other words, when the total supply of Treasuries shifts, the equilibrium
holdings of groups with more elastic demand curves change more. This can be seen directly in the ﬁrst stage
of the IV estimation which is also shown in Table VI.
The most inelastic groups are the governmental holders of Treasury securities (Federal Reserve Banks,
Foreign Oﬃcial Holdings, State/Local Governments). These groups are also among the largest holders of
Treasury securities. This suggests that the neutrality and liquidity motives are principal determinants of the
convenience yield. Banks/Credit institutions followclosely behind the governmental groups in the inelasticity
of demand. As noted earlier, this group is driven by the liquidity motive.
If the convenience yield is driven mainly by the neutrality and liquidity motives then we would expect
19We do not impose the restrictions that A,B and C are functions of the group demand coeﬃcients because of the approxi-
mation error we have introduced in aggregating the demand curves across groups.
22that groups for which these motives matter less should have the most elastic Treasury demands. This is what
we ﬁnd. The groups with more elastic demands are the Households and Mutual Funds, the Foreign Private
Sector, and the long-term investor groups (State/Local Retirement Funds, Private Pensions, and Insurance
Companies). The Households and Mutual Funds and the Foreign Private Sector fall in the middle of the
ranking of demand elasticities. These groups are motivated by a combination of the liquidity and surety
motive. The most elastic demanders are the long-term investor groups, who we know are not aﬀected by the
liquidity and neutrality motives and are probably indirectly driven by the surety motive of their claimants.
These observations suggest that the surety motive is secondary to the liquidity and neutrality motives in
determining the convenience yield.
5.3 IV Using Foreign Oﬃcial Holdings and Stock of Debt
In the ﬁrst stage of the IV estimation reported in Table VI, the ability of log(Debt/GDP) to explain
movements in groups’ Treasury holdings diﬀers across groups. The t-statistics are the lowest for Federal
Reserve Banks and Foreign Oﬃcial Holdings, suggesting that a substantial fraction of the variation in these
groups’ holdings are generated by other factors. If these other factors are exogenous in the sense of being
uncorrelated with shocks aﬀecting other (more elastic) groups’ demand, then holdings of Federal Reserve
Banks and Foreign Oﬃcial Holdings can serve as additional instruments for the estimation of the other
groups’ demand curves, over and above the instrument used above (the total supply of Treasuries).
Importantly, the availability of several instruments allows us to perform tests of the overidentifying
restrictions in order to test the validity (exogeneity) of the instruments. In what follows we focus on two
instruments, total Treasury supply and ForeignOﬃcial Holdings. Tests of overidentifying restrictions rejected
Federal Reserve Bank holdings as a valid instrument, but did not reject the Foreign Oﬃcial Holdings as a
valid instrument (see Table VII).
We note that on a priori grounds, this is what one may expect. Federal Reserve Holdings are driven by
monetary policy which is likely to be correlated with US demand conditions. On the other hand, changes in
the reserve holdings of foreign central banks are largely driven by capital inﬂows into foreign countries and
the exchange rate policies of these countries, which are plausibly exogenous to US demand conditions. If
foreign central banks hold their dollar reserves in Treasury securities20, then changes in the capital account
will lead to changes in foreign central banks’ holdings of Treasury securities and changes to the equilibrium
in the Treasury market.




































20In practice, foreign central banks hold the dollar reserves in Treasury securities and Agency securities.
23Then, approximating the geometric average with the arithmetic average we have,
St = A1 + B1 log(ΘT
t /GDPt)+B2 log(θFOH




If we assume that changes in θFOH
t are uncorrelated with ei,t (i  = FOH), given the controls, then
log(θFOH
t /GDPt) can be used as a second instrument for the demand system.
We use 2SLS to estimate group i’s demand curve using log(ΘT
t /GDPt)a n dlog(θFOH
t /GDPt) as instru-
m e n t s . I nt h eﬁ r s ts t a g e ,w er e g r e s slog(θi
t/GDPt)o nlog(ΘT
t /GDPt)a n dlog(θFOH
t /GDPt), as well as
controls Yt.T h ec o n t r o l sYt include the BAA − AAA spread, slope and a time trend. The ﬁtted values are
used to estimate the demand curve:
St = Ai + Bi  log(Θi
t/GDPt)+Ci Yt +  i,t.
Table VII, Panel A presents the ﬁrst stage estimates. The coeﬃcient estimates on log(ΘT
t /GDPt)i s
positive for all groups, and the coeﬃcient estimate on log(θFOH
t /GDPt) is negative for most groups. An
increase in the total stock of Treasuries is a rightward shift of the supply curve facing a group. Thus we
would expect that the coeﬃcient on total stock is positive. The second coeﬃcient estimate should be negative
because as FOH hold more Treasury securities, the residual supply facing a group shifts leftward. Note that
group i’s holdings are not equal to total supply less FOH holdings (this relation only holds for the sum over
all groups). Thus, the sign patterns in the ﬁrst-stage regressions are not driven by some mechanical relation
(indeed they do not hold for two of the groups).
Table VII, Panel B presents the estimates of the slope of the demand curve, by group. The slope estimates
are similar to those reported in Table VI.
Because these regressions have two instrumental variables, the demand systems are overidentiﬁed and we
can test the validity (exogeneity) of the instruments. The last column in Panel B reports the p-values from
the test of the overidentifying restrictions. The p-values are high in all but one case, conﬁrming that our
instruments are not endogenous. Note that this result is also comforting for the regressions we reported in
the previous section, where we only used total stock of government debt as an instrument.
5.4 Change in Demand
Over the last 60 years, foreign holders of Treasuries have increased their holdings from 1% to 45% of the
stock of Treasuries. The largest change is due to foreign oﬃcial holders who have increased their holdings
from 1% to 29%. Over the same period, banks and credit institutions have decreased their holdings from
42% to 3% while insurance companies have decreased their holdings from 9% to 3%. These patterns suggest
a shift over time in the composition of Treasury holders from more elastic holders to less elastic holders,
perhaps causing the aggregate demand for Treasuries to steepen over time.
24Table VIII presents results for the corporate bond spread regressions and the CP-Bills spread regression,
broken down by subsample. The breakpoint is 1971, which is the year when the Bretton-Woods system was
abandoned. The foreign oﬃcial holdings increase markedly beginning in 1971, and thus the abandonment of
the Bretton-Woods system is a natural breakpoint for the sample.
Consistent with our conjecture that the demand curve has steepened over time, the slope coeﬃcients are
uniformly higher in the later period than in the earlier period. The coeﬃcients are also signiﬁcant and of
the same order of magnitude as in previously reported regressions. Since the samples are short, we only
introduce the BAA − AAA spread control in these regressions.
6 Exponential Speciﬁcation
Thus far we have reported regressions for log-linear speciﬁcations involving log(Debt/GDP). As Figure 1
illustrates, the relation between the corporate bond yield spread and the Debt/GDP ratio should involve
an asymptote: the spread should asymptote to a non-negative number as Debt/GDP becomes large. This
asymptote can be interpreted as the part of the spread that is due purely to default, risk premium, and tax
diﬀerences between AAA corporate bonds and Treasuries, rather than a convenience yield on Treasuries. The
log(Debt/GDP) speciﬁcation implies that the spread will become negative for suﬃciently large Debt/GDP
ratios. In this section we estimate a regression speciﬁcation with the property that the spread asymptotes
to a non-negative constant.
We consider the following exponential speciﬁcation:21,22
St = b0 + b1e
b2×(Debt/GDP) + c × Yt +  t.
Table IX reports the results. Column (1) reports the results where we suppress the constant term (i.e.
b0 = 0). Column (2) includes the constant term, and column (3) present results where we introduce the
controls we have considered in other regressions. The controls are the BAA − AAA spread and the slope
21We have also considered a speciﬁcation where the Debt/GDP term is b1(Debt/GDP)b2. The latter speciﬁcation yields a
worse ﬁt.
22The exponential speciﬁcation can be motivated structurally as follows. Suppose that,
v (·)=e−β1ΘT




















Note that αct is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, γt.I ft a k e γt as well as ct/GDPt to be approximately constant over
time than we can write,










which is the speciﬁcation we adopt.
25of the yield curve (slope). The control variables have been demeaned so that b0 can be interpreted as the
asymptote value of the corporate bond spread.
The results are consistent with intuition. b2 is negative to ﬁt the inverse relation between the yield spread
and the Debt/GDP ratio. b0 is small, but positive, consistent with the point we have noted about the spread
asymptoting to a positive value.
The asymptote values are 7 bps and 13 bps (although not statistically diﬀerent from zero). Our results
thus suggest that the default, risk premium, and tax component of the spread is small, which seems plausible
given the existing literature on corporate bond valuation. For example, Elton et al (2001) consider actual
default rates and bankruptcy recovery rates on AAA corporate debt and show that a risk neutral investor will
require at most 5 bps default premium to buy a 10 year corporate bond. Taking into account the diﬀerential
state tax treatment of corporate and government bonds (see Section 8.2) can increase this spread to at most
35 bps a c c o r d i n gt oE l t o net al (2001)’s calculations.
Figure 5: Exponential Speciﬁcation of Demand Curve

















































































The ﬁgure on the left presents a scatter plot of the corporate bond yield spread (y-axis)and the Debt/GDP
ratio (x-axis), using annual data from 1925 to 2005. Also pictured in the ﬁgure are the predicted values
from the exponential speciﬁcation of the relation between the yield spread and Debt/GDP ratio. The ﬁgure
on the right presents a similar result, but presenting the predicted values from the exponential speciﬁcation
including controls. The corporate bond yield spread (y-axis of right panel) is adjusted to remove the eﬀect
of the control variables.
Figure 5 presents the results of the exponential speciﬁcation in graphical form. The ﬁgures plot the
predicted values of the spread from the speciﬁcation with and without controls of Table IX. Also pictured
26are scatter plots of the corporate bond yield spread (y-axis) and the Debt/GDP ratio (x-axis). The corporate
bond yield spread in the righthand panel of the ﬁgure (y-axis of right panel) is adjusted to remove the eﬀect
of the control variables.
7 Implications
The main ﬁnding of this paper is that the demand curve for convenience provided by Treasury debt is down-
ward sloping. In earlier sections of the paper, we have discussed the implications of this ﬁnding for corporate
bond pricing and the interpretation of the spread between corporate bond and Treasury bond yields. We
have also argued that the liquidity motive is likely to be one of the main drivers of the convenience yield on
Treasuries. In this section, we ﬁrst use our estimates to quantify the aggregate value of liquidity/convenience
to investors. We then discuss the implications of our ﬁndings for some other important issues in ﬁnance and
macroeconomics.
7.1 Value of Treasury Liquidity/Convenience to Investors
Investors purchase Treasury securities despite the fact that these securities oﬀer a low return because they
convey liquidity/convenience beneﬁts. In this subsection we quantify the total annual value that investors
place on the beneﬁts of Treasuries. Because of the evidence that AAA corporate bonds are substitutes for
Treasury debt, this total annual value is a lower bound on the value of aggregate bond market liquidity to
investors.
Table X presents the results. We ask how much investors will pay, as a yearly ﬂow cost (percentage of
GDP), in order to enjoy the beneﬁts of a particular level of Treasuries/GDP, starting from a scenario with
a Treasury/GDP ratio of zero. The calculations are based on the exponential speciﬁcation with b0 =0 ,
b1 =2 .5a n db2 = −3.3. We set b0 to zero in order to focus only on the beneﬁts of Treasuries as opposed to
the default, risk premium, and tax component of the corporate bond spread. Results are shown for diﬀerent
values of relative risk aversion.
The ﬁrst number in the third column is 0.19%. The interpretation of this number is that investors with
a relative risk aversion of one will pay 0.19% of GDP every year in order to enjoy the beneﬁts of having a
Treasury/GDP ratio of 0.10. To compute this number, we ask how much consumption agents will be willing




T,0,GDP)=u(c) − u(c − δ × GDP).
The computation is based on integrating our estimate of v (ΘT;GDP)/u (c)o v e rΘ T/GDP,u s i n gt h e
27function b1eb2ΘT /GDP as v (ΘT;GDP)/u (c).23
Of particular interest is the value investors place on the current stock of Treasuries. The Debt/GDP
ratio is currently about 0.38. Across the diﬀerent values of relative risk aversion, the value investors put on
this amount of aggregate liquidity is between 0.21% and 0.54% of GDP per year. With US GDP for 2005
at $12.5 Trillion, this corresponds to between $26 and $68 Billion in beneﬁts for the year 2005. Finally, we
note that these ﬁgures are ﬂow beneﬁts that are enjoyed annually. As a back-of-the-envelope calculation, if
we take the present value of a $26 billion ($68 billion) real perpetuity at a real discount rate of 2%, the stock
value of the beneﬁt is $1.3 trillion ($3.4 trillion).
The numbers from Table X also shed light on the cost of aggregate liquidity contractions to investors.
Many accounts of ﬁnancial crises emphasize that negative shocks to ﬁnancial intermediaries decrease their
ability to maintain the continuous trading liquidity of asset markets, and thereby reduce the liquidity of
ﬁnancial assets (see, for example, Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2006). As the liquidity of all assets falls,
the aggregate pool of liquid assets available to investors shrinks. This scenario – a disintermediation induced
reduction in aggregate liquidity – is costly to investors. If we make the identifying assumption that a
reduction in aggregate liquidity caused by disintermediation is similar to a reduction in aggregate liquidity
caused by a decline in Treasury debt issuance, we can use our estimation results to evaluate the cost of
aggregate liquidity contractions. From Table X we see that if aggregate liquidity falls from 1 to 0.3, the
consumption ﬂow cost of this fall ranges from 0.06% of GDP to 0.25% of GDP.
23We have assumed a utility function with arguments u(c)+v(ΘT /GDP). The ﬁrst order condition from this utility function




∂ΘT ≡ G(ΘT /GDP)
The regressions we present use the bond yield spread as dependent variable and ΘT /GDP as independent variable. Thus these
regressions estimate the function G(ΘT /GDP). To use the regression estimates to make the relevant computation, we deﬁne
D =Θ T /GDP,s ot h a t
dv(D)
dD = GDP × G(D)u (c). Then,




Our deﬁnition of δ is,
v(D1) − v(0) = u(c) − u(c − δ × GDP) ≈ u (c)δ × GDP −
1
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where γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. We report δ for various values of γ and a value of GDP/c of 1.5 in the table.
G(D) is the function we estimate and is in units of percent per year. Thus δ is in units of percentage of GDP per year.
287.2 Value of Convenience to Taxpayers
Because investors value the convenience features of Treasuries, the US Treasury is able to sell Treasury bonds
at a premium. We have argued that this is a key driver of the substantially lower yield on Treasuries than on
AAA corporate bonds. It is interesting to evaluate how much taxpayers beneﬁt from being able to ﬁnance
the US federal debt with securities that have special beneﬁts to investors.
As a simple partial equilibrium calculation, consider how large the convenience yield is at the current
Debt/GDP ratio based on our exponential speciﬁcation (with b0 set to zero): Using b1 =2 .5a n db2 = −3.3
the convenience yield component of the spread is 2.5e−3.3×0.38 =0 .71 percentage points. Therefore, the
yield on Treasuries would be about 71 bps higher if Treasuries did not provide convenience beneﬁts over and
above AAA corporate bonds. That would imply increased interest expenses of 0.71× 0.38 = 0.27% of GDP
per year, assuming the Debt/GDP ratio was kept constant at 0.38.
To put this number in perspective, consider the beneﬁts taxpayers enjoy from households’ willingness
to hold ﬁat money at no interest. The monetary base at the end of 2005 was $787 Billion, corresponding
to 6.3% of GDP. Suppose the federal government had to repurchase the monetary base by issuing Treasury
bills and that these Treasury bills had a 5% nominal yield. Then the annual interest expense to taxpayers
of this additional debt would be 5 × 0.063 = 0.32% of GDP per year.
Together, these calculations suggest that the annual beneﬁt to taxpayers from being able to ﬁnance the
current level of debt with securities that have a convenience yield are about as large as the annual beneﬁt
to taxpayers resulting from the public’s willingness to hold money at no interest.
7.3 The Eﬀect of Foreign Oﬃcial Demand on Treasury Yields
Some recent papers in international ﬁnance argue that the US government has a special ability to supply
ﬁnancial assets to the world’s savers (see Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2006), and Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau and Garber (2003)). These papers tie the US current account deﬁcit to the demand for US assets
by foreign savers (see also Bernanke (2005)).
Our ﬁnding that the demand for Treasury debt from foreign oﬃcial holders is very inelastic is consistent
with these theories. Our estimates of the slope of the Treasury demand curve also oﬀers some insight into
the interest rate eﬀect of the demand by foreign investors. If foreign oﬃcial investors exit the US Treasury
market, they will sell roughly 29% of the debt back to US investors. Based on the log-linear demand curve
we estimate, the sale will raise Treasury yields, relative to corporate bond yields, by between 19 bps and
55 bps. Using the exponential demand curve gives a value of 31 bps.
We arrive at these numbers as follows. Currently the Debt/GDP ratio is 0.38 of which foreign oﬃcial
investors own 0.11 and the rest of investors own 0.27. If foreign oﬃcial investors sell their 0.11, then the rest
29of investors have to increase their holdingsto 0.38. We have shown that foreign oﬃcial investors have inelastic
demand curves for Treasury debt. Thus the slope of the aggregate demand curve for Treasury convenience
must reﬂect the preferences of the rest of investors. We evaluate our estimated aggregate demand curve at
points 0.27 and 0.38, computing the diﬀerence in the convenience yield between these points to arrive at the
numbers we present. The range for the log-linear estimate comes from using estimates from Table I-A, Panel
B, column (2) and Table IV-B, column (2). For the exponential demand case we use b1 =2 .5a n db2 = −3.3.
7.4 Beneﬁts to Retirement Savers from Investing in Corporate Bonds
Our results suggest that investors who purchase Treasuries earn a substantially lower yield than they would
earn had they instead purchased AAA corporate bonds. Indeed, our exponential speciﬁcation implies that
only 7 − 13 bps of the yield spread between AAA corporate bonds and Treasury bonds is compensation for
risk and tax treatment. The bulk of the spread is (negative) compensation for the liquidity and neutrality
features of Treasuries.
Therefore, investors who do not place much value on the liquidity features of Treasuries would be better
oﬀ buying AAA corporate bonds than Treasury bonds. As an example, consider a conservative investor who
is saving for retirement. Suppose the investor is 30 years old, plans to invest $15,000 for retirement at the
end of each year up to age 60, and expects to live to age 80. If the investor invests in Treasuries with an
expected real return of 2% (say), then the annual real consumption per year in retirement will be $37,215.
If the investor instead invested in AAA corporate bonds and earned an extra 0.71% in annual return (our
estimate of the convenience yield on Treasuries at the current Debt/GDP ratio), then the person could enjoy
an annual real consumption of $44,557 per year in retirement, a 20% increase over the annual consumption
in the ﬁrst scenario.
7.5 Implications for the “Riskless” Interest Rate
Our ﬁnding of a convenience demand for Treasury debt suggests caution against the common practice of
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implied by the standard discrete-time C-CAPM model.24 I no r d e rt or e c o v e rt h e
true riskless rate from the data (the rate that can meaningfully be compared to the riskless rate from a
model that ignores the convenience beneﬁts of Treasuries), one has to estimate the convenience yield and
adjust Treasury rates by this convenience yield. Our estimated demand curves may be used to measure the
convenience yield and make the adjustment.
24Duﬃe and Singleton (1997) make a similar point in the context of the term structure literature, and advocate using swap
rates instead of Treasury rates.
30Our results also have bearing for puzzles regarding high measured return spreads and excess comovement
of spreads. Since many asset market return spreads are measured relative to Treasury interest rates, the
demand for Treasury liquidity and variation in this demand will generate high average asset yield spreads
over Treasuries as well as comovement in spreads and excess returns across diﬀerent asset classes. There is
empirical support for both of these observations. As noted earlier the magnitude of corporate bond and swap
spreads are hard to reconcile based purely on default considerations. The literature also has documented pat-
terns of unexplained comovement. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) show that credit spread
changes within the corporate bond market are highly correlated. Boudoukh, Richardson, Stanton, and
Whitelaw (1997) document similar evidence from the mortgage backed securities market. Gabaix, Krish-
namurthy, and Vigneron (2006) show that corporate bond spreads and mortgage backed spreads comove.
Variation in the Treasury convenience yield is one possible explanation for the comovement phenomena.
8 Robustness
This section present a series of robustness checks of our main regressions.
8.1 Additional Default Controls
Table XI presents results that include other default controls, in addition to the BAA-AAA Moody’s spread
of earlier regressions. Column (1) presents a default control from Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2006)
(that is drawn from Chava and Jarrow, 2004). The authors consider a sample of publicly traded ﬁrms in
the Wall Street Journal Index, the SDC database, SEC ﬁlings and the CCH Capital Changes Reporter. If
a ﬁrm ﬁles for bankruptcy, delists, or receives a D rating, over the period January 1963 through December
2003, the ﬁrm is labeled as distressed. The percentage of distressed ﬁrms in each year is the measure of
aggregate default risk. This variable has a correlation of 0.13 with the BAA-AAA spread. Column (2)
considers a similar default control which covers a longer time period (1927 - 1997). The default measure is
the percentage of ﬁrms in the Dun and Bradstreet database that fail in any given year. This default risk
measure has a correlation of 0.46 with the BAA-AAA spread. Last, column (3) presents regressions that
include the volatility of the stock market to proxy for the risk of default. We measure the standard deviation
of the value weighted stock market index (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) over the previous 36 months, ending
with June of the present year. The variable has a correlation of 0.78 with the BAA-AAA spread.
The inclusion of alternative default controls does not alter the importance of the Debt/GDP ratio in
the regressions. The diﬀerences in the coeﬃcient on log(Debt/GDP) in the three speciﬁcations is primarily
due to the diﬀerent sample periods for each regression. The results also suggest that the BAA-AAA spread
serves as a good control for default risk.
318.2 State Tax Eﬀects
Corporate bonds are taxed at the federal, state and local levels, while Treasury bonds are only taxed at the
federal level. Thus, the diﬀerence in yields between corporate and Treasury bonds will in part reﬂect state
and local tax rates. Loosely speaking our expression in (2) applies to yields where the two bonds are taxed
equivalently. If the measured pre-tax yield on corporate bonds is ˆ yC
t , then the eﬀect of state and local taxes
is to reduce this yield to yC
t =ˆ yC
t (1 − tax), where tax is the tax rate. yC
t i st h ea f t e rs t a t ea n dl o c a lt a x
yield and is now comparable to the Treasury yield.









+ tax ˆ yC
t .
We can think of our previous expression in (2) as applying to the diﬀerence between yC
t and yT
t . Therefore,
we need to introduce an independent variable equal to tax ˆ yC
t to control for the state and local tax eﬀect.
We construct a time series of estimated state and local tax rates for high-income tax ﬁlers for the years
1944-2003 based on data in the IRS publication Statistics of Income. Households who itemize deductions on
their 1040 tax forms list taxes paid on Schedule A along with its four components, “state and local income
taxes,” “real estate taxes,” “personal property taxes,” and “other taxes.” Beginning in 1972, the Statistics
of Income lists the state and local income tax component separately. For earlier years, only the total taxes
paid deduction is listed.
Furthermore, for each year, the Statistics of Income lists both “adjusted gross income less deﬁcit” and
“taxes paid”, tabulated by income category. We focus on households in the income category $1,000,000 and
higher. This is done for two reasons. First, high-income households are likely more relevant for the pricing
of bonds than less wealthy households. Second, for high-income households the vast majority (88.7% on
average across the years 1972-2003) of taxes paid are state and local income taxes.25
From this data, we estimate a state and local tax rate time series for high-income households going back
to 1944. We do this by multiplying taxes paid for each year by 0.887 to measure the state and local income
taxes paid by the high income ﬁlers. Our estimated tax rate is computed by taking the ratio of this state
and local taxes paid to adjusted gross income less deﬁcit.26
The results are reported in Table XII. Our results are robust to the state tax controls. In column (2),
the coeﬃcient on the tax rate is 0.48 and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Theory suggests the coeﬃcient should
be one if the high-income households are the only agents who determine the bond yield spread. When we
25This is not the case for the full set of households for which the ratio of state and local income taxes paid to total taxes paid
averages 53.7% across the years 1972-2003 and is much less stable across years than for high-income ﬁlers.
26For the years 1951, 1955, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, and 1974 the Statistics of Income does not provide
the taxes paid information we need and for 1978 adjusted gross income less deﬁcit is not provided by income category. For
these years we linearly interpolate the state and local income tax rate based on the prior and subsequent year of data.
32include the BAA-AAA spread (column (3)), the coeﬃcient on the state tax rate turns negative and becomes
insigniﬁcant. Finally, we note that the average value of the tax rate is 5.2% and the average value of the tax
rate variable is 35 bps. Even if taxes are a signiﬁcant determinant of the corporate bond spread, taxes can
at most explain only 35 bps of the spread.
8.3 Regressions, by Subsample
Table XIII presents results for the main corporate bond spread regression by subsample. The ﬁrst column
reports the results of the regression if we exclude the years 1942 to 1951. During World War II and its
immediate aftermath, the government imposed interest rate controls the Treasury market. The Fed-Treasury
Accord (Wicker, 1969) eﬀectively ﬁxed the interest rate on short term Treasury borrowings. The evidence
in column (1) conﬁrms that our results are not driven by any idiosyncrasies due to this period.
Many Treasury bonds that were issued in the 1910s, 1920s and 1930s were exempt from Federal taxes
(Homer, 1977). These tax eﬀects could drive a large wedge between Treasury and corporate bond yields.
Column (2) reports results from excluding the years 1925-1941. Column (3) reports results from excluding
the years 1925-1951. Again, our main ﬁndings are not driven by these periods. The coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
and of the same order of magnitude as in previously reported regressions.
8.4 Scaling by Wealth
Table XIV presents the results from redoing regressions by scaling the stock of publicly held debt by a wealth
measure rather than GDP. In previous regressions we use the GDP scaling to capture growth in the demand
for convenience as the economy grows. Alternatively, one may imagine that the demand for Treasuries is a
function of ﬁnancial wealth. Thus we scale by household assets, deﬁned as total household ﬁnancial assets
(including mutual fund assets and pension fund assets), as measured in the Flow of Funds Accounts of the
Federal Reserve, Table L.100. The wealth data is available beginning in 1945.
The results from Table XIV are similar to previous regressions for the corporate bond spread. The sign
on log(Debt/FinAss) is negative and of the same order of magnitude of previous results. The results for
the swap spread and the CP-Bills spread are no longer signiﬁcant. As noted earlier, our results are weakest
when trying to explain the CP-Bills spread.
Finally, we have also redone the group level demand estimates, scaling each group’s security holdings
by that group’s ﬁnancial assets. The results are not meaningful for some groups whose holdings (of US
assets) consists largely of Treasury securities (central banks). We also do not have total asset holdings for
the foreign private sector. For the remaining groups, the results are largely consistent with our reported
results in Tables VI and VII and are available upon request.
338.5 Excluding Fed Holdings
Table XV presents results from excluding the Federal Reserve Banks’ holdings when constructing the stock of
Treasury debt measure. In previous regressions, the stock of debt included Federal Reserve Banks’ holdings
in order to conform to the existing macroeconomics literature. In addition, since Federal Reserve Banks’
holdings are not available until 1945, the sample periods are shorter when using the ﬁner measure of publicly
held debt. The results are in line with previously reported results with the exception that the coeﬃcients of
the swap spread regressions lose signiﬁcance.
8.6 Level of Interest Rates
Table XVI reports regressions where we include the level of interest rates as an additional covariate. Columns
(1) and (2) include a measure of the real Federal Funds rate. The idea is to capture any changes in the
stance of monetary policy. The real rate in column (1) is based on the average nominal Federal Funds rate
minus the annual CPI inﬂation rate over the same year. The real rate in column (2) is based on the average
nominal Federal Funds rate minus the annual CPI inﬂation rate over the preceding year.
Column (3) includes the AAA nominal rate as covariate. As noted above, the state tax eﬀect is propor-
tional to the AAA rate. Thus, if one thinks that our tax rate in the tax-eﬀect regression is mismeasured,
then only including the AAA rate may be a better control for tax eﬀects. Additionally, Duﬀee (1988) points
out that the Moody’s AAA index includes callable corporate bonds, while the Treasury bonds are typically
non-callable. Thus the bond yield spread will reﬂect the option value of calling the bond. Duﬀee suggests
controlling for this eﬀect using the level of interest rates as a regressor.
Uniformly the results in the table show that our results are robust to including the level of interest rates
as control. The larger coeﬃcients in the speciﬁcations in columns (1) and (2) are because the sample is
from 1955 to 2005. As a comparison, only including log(Debt/GDP) as independent variable for the shorter
sample yields a coeﬃcient of −1.44 with T-statistic of 7.29.
9C o n c l u s i o n
We show that the demand curve for convenience provided by Treasury debt is downward sloping and provide
estimates of the elasticity of demand. A hypothetical rise in the Debt/GDP ratio from its current value of
0.38 to a new value of 0.39 will increase the spread between corporate bond yields and Treasury bond yields
between 1.5bps (Table I-A, Panel B, column (2)) and 4.25bps (Table IV-B, column (2)).
We also analyze disaggregated data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve and ﬁnd
evidence consistent with the aggregate analysis. Individualgroups of Treasury holders have downward sloping
34demand curves. Even groups with the most elastic demand curves have demand curves that are far from
ﬂat.
Our results suggest that US government debt is a special asset that oﬀers a convenience yield to investors.
Our estimates imply that the value of the liquidity provided by the current level of Treasuries is between
0.21 and 0.54% of GDP per year.
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38Table I-A
Explaining the Corporate Bond Yield Spread
The dependent variable is the corporate bond yield spread, measured as the spread between
the Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yield and the average yield on long maturity (> 10
years) Treasury bonds, both measure in percentage units. Both data series are from the
Federal Reserve. Independent variables are based on the real book value of Treasury debt
outstanding, real US GDP, and the spread between Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s AAA long
maturity bond yields, and a control for the slope of the yield curve measured as the spread
between the 10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury yield (slope). All regressions
include a constant. Panel A presents OLS regressions, with t-statistics based on Newey-
West robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel B presents GLS regressions; speciﬁcally,
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) iterated regressions (ρ reported below). Data are annual, beginning
in 1925 and ending in 2005.
Panel A: OLS
(1) (2) (3)
log(Debt/GDP) -0.77 (8.09) -0.70 (7.24) -0.76 (6.44)
BAA − AAA 0.13 (2.91) 0.09 (1.69)
slope 0.05 (1.32)
R2 0.58 0.62 0.61
N 81 81 81
Panel B: GLS
(1) (2) (3)
log(Debt/GDP) -0.63 (4.48) -0.55 (3.85) -0.59 (3.93)
BAA − AAA 0.19 (3.42) 0.17 (3.21)
slope 0.03 (0.91)
R2 0.17 0.28 0.29
ρ 0.75 0.77 0.77
N 80 80 80
39Table I-B
Explaining the CP-Bills Yield Spread
The dependent variable is the annualized yield diﬀerential between short-term commercial
paper and Treasury Bills, constructed as described in the text. Independent variables are
based on the real book value of Treasury debt outstanding, real US GDP, the spread between
Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yields, and the spread between the
10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury yield (slope). All regressions include a
constant. Panel A presents OLS regressions, with t-statistics based on Newey-West robust
standard errors in parentheses. Panel B presents GLS regressions; speciﬁcally, Cochrane-
Orcutt AR(1) iterated regressions (ρ reported below). Data are annual, beginning in 1921
and ending in 2005.
Panel A: OLS
(1) (2) (3)
log(Debt/GDP) -0.64 (5.83) -0.52 (4.30) -0.24 (2.38)
BAA − AAA 0.20 (3.94) 0.38 (7.93)
slope -0.23 (5.73)
R2 0.34 0.44 0.63
N 85 85 85
Panel B: GLS
(1) (2) (3)
log(Debt/GDP) -0.63 (4.55) -0.55 (3.87) -0.28 (2.61)
BAA − AAA 0.15 (2.53) 0.33 (7.92)
slope -0.20 (5.03)
R2 0.21 0.27 0.52
ρ 0.42 0.37 0.17
N 84 84 84
40Table II
Explaining the Swap Spread
The dependent variable is the 10 year interest rate swap spread, measured as the spread
between the 10 year swap rate and the 10 year Treasury note yield, both measured in
percentage units. Independent variables are based on the real book value of Treasury debt
outstanding, real US GDP, and the spread between Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s AAA
long maturity bond yields, and the spread between the 10 year Treasury yield and the 3
month Treasury yield (slope). All regressions include a constant. Panel A presents OLS
regressions, with t-statistics based on Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses.
Panel B presents GLS regressions; speciﬁcally, Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) iterated regressions
(ρ reported below). Data are annual, beginning in 1987 and ending in 2005.
Panel A: OLS
(1) (2) (3)
log(Debt/GDP) -0.89 (1.95) -0.63 (1.00) -0.16 (0.34)
BAA − AAA 0.32 (0.74) 0.35 (1.19)
slope - 0.16 (4.14)
R2 0.21 0.26 0.56
N 19 19 19
Panel B: GLS
(1) (2) (3)
log(Debt/GDP) -1.58 (1.93) -1.31 (1.95) -1.06 (1.55)
BAA − AAA -0.21 (0.91) -0.01 (0.05)
slope -0.07 (2.16)
R2 0.32 0.30 0.46
ρ 0.79 0.62 0.66
N 18 18 18
41Table III-A
Bond Returns and the Yield Spread
The dependent variable is the percentage excess return on long term corporate bonds over long term govern-
ment bonds, at one, three, and ﬁve year horizons. Return data are from Ibottson, and are annual, beginning
in 1926 and ending in 2004. Independent variables are the spread between Moody’s AAA long maturity
bond yields and the average yield on long maturity (> 10 years) Treasury bonds, and the spread between
the 10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury yield (slope). All regressions include a constant. For
horizons over one year, the regressions report t-statistics based on Newey-West robust standard errors.
1-year 3-year 5-year
AAA − Treasury 1.79 (2.14) 1.78 (2.12) 4.73 (2.59) 4.66 (2.52) 6.33 (1.99) 6.23 (2.00)
slope -0.10 (0.40) -1.07 (1.47) -2.48 (2.74)
R2 0.05 0.05
N 79 79 77 77 75 75
42Table III-B
Explaining Bond Returns
The dependent variable is the excess return on long term corporate bonds over long term government bonds,
at one, three, and ﬁve year horizons. Return data are from Ibottson, and are annual, beginning in 1926
and ending in 2004. Independent variables are based on the real book value of Treasury debt outstanding,
real US GDP, and the spread between the 10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury yield (slope).
Additional independent variables include the realized returns on long term government bonds over short
term bonds (durationhedge) and the four factor controls (market, HML, SMB, momentum). All regressions
include a constant. For horizons over one year, the regressions report t-statistics based on Newey-West
robust standard errors.
1-year Excess Returns 3-year Excess Returns
log(Debt/GDP) -0.98 (1.14) -0.98 (1.05) -1.01 (1.39) -4.22 (2.92) -3.74 (1.99) -4.91 (2.98)
slope 0.00 (0.01) -0.66 (0.71)
durationhedge -0.19 (4.69) -0.05 (0.05)
Four-factor Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
R2 0.02 0.06 0.31
N 79 79 79 77 77 77
5-year Excess Returns
log(Debt/GDP) -7.90 (2.45) -6.68 (1.86) -8.43 (2.91)
slope -1.68 (1.39)
durationhedge -0.05 (1.33)
Four-factor Controls NO NO YES
N 75 75 75
43Table IV-A
Explaining the BAA-AAA Spread
The dependent variable is the spread between the Moody’s BAA long maturity bond yield and Moody’s
AAA long maturity bond yield, both measure in percentage units. Both data series are from the Federal
Reserve. Independent variables are based on the real book value of Treasury debt outstanding, real US GDP,
and two controls for the slope of the yield curve: the spread between average yield on long maturity (> 10
years) Treasury bonds and the 10 year Treasury yield (slopelong); and, the spread between the 10 year
Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury yield (slope). All regressions include a constant. OLS regressions
report t-statistics based on Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses. Data are annual, beginning
in 1920 (columns (1) and (3)) or 1925 (columns (2) and (4)) and ending in 2005.
OLS GLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Debt/GDP) -0.62 (3.44) -0.86 (4.84) -0.27 (0.69) -0.48 (1.59)
slope 0.31 (2.93) 0.17 (3.26)
R2 0.12 0.33 0.01 0.14
ρ 0.83 0.80
N 87 81 86 80
44Table IV-B
Explaining the BAA-Treasury Yield Spread
The dependent variable is the low grade corporate bond yield spread, measured as the spread between the
Moody’s BAA long maturity bond yield and the average yield on long maturity (> 10 years) Treasury bonds,
both measured in percentage units. Both data series are from the Federal Reserve. Independent variables
are based on the real book value of Treasury debt outstanding, real US GDP, and the spread between the
10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury yield (slope). All regressions include a constant. OLS
regressions report t-statistics based on Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses. Data are annual,
beginning in 1925 and ending in 2005.
OLS GLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Debt/GDP) -1.31 (5.85) -1.62 (7.60) -0.86 (1.99) -1.26 (4.02)
slope 0.45 (3.73) 0.25 (3.38)
R2 0.33 0.55 0.05 0.21
ρ 0.80 0.76
N 81 81 80 80
Table V
Who holds Treasury Debt?
This table presents statistics on the fraction of Treasury securities held by various
groups. The data are from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve, and are
annual (Q2) from 1945 to 2005. Mutual funds include closed-end fudns and exchange
traded funds.
Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. 1945 2005
Federal Reserve Banks 61 .14 .04 .10 .16
Foreign Oﬃcial Holdings 61 .10 .07 .01 .29
State/Local Governments 61 .09 .04 .02 .10
Banks/Credit Institutions 61 .21 .11 .42 .03
Households and Mutual Funds 61 .27 .05 .26 .16
Foreign Private Sector 61 .04 .05 0 .16
State/Local Government Retirement Funds 61 .03 .02 .01 .03
Private Pensions 61 .03 .02 .01 .02
Insurance Companies 61 .05 .02 .09 .03
45Table VI
Semi-elasticity of Demand Curves, by Group
This table presents estimates of the semi-elasticity of the demand curve for Treasury securities, by group. The
dependent variable is the corporate bond yield spread, measured as the spread between the Moody’s AAA
long maturity bond yield and the average yield on long maturity (> 10 years) Treasury bonds, both measured
in percentage units. Both data series are from the Federal Reserve. Controls include the spread between
Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yields, a time trend, and the spread between the 10
year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury yield (slope). All regressions include a constant. The demand
curves are estimated using the total stock of Treasury debt as an instrument. We report the coeﬃcient
estimate on log(Debt/GDP) in the ﬁrst stage as well as the semi-elasticity estimate for each group in the
second stage. The Treasury holdings data are from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve,
and are annual (Q2) from 1945 to 2005, except for the Foreign Private Sector for which data begin in 1957.
t-statistics based on Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses.
Group First Stage Coeﬃcient
on log(Debt/GDP) Semi-elasticity N
Federal Reserve Banks 0.24 (2.14) -2.72 (1.38) 61
Foreign Oﬃcial Holdings 0.07 (0.31) -9.44 (0.31) 61
State/Local Governments 0.58 (3.29) -1.14 (4.72) 61
Banks/Credit Institutions 0.67 (8.97) -0.99 (3.41) 61
Households and Mutual Funds 1.12 (11.19) -0.59 (3.18) 61
Foreign Private Sector 3.03 (4.23) -0.44 (6.20) 49
State/Local Retirement Funds 1.69 (6.02) -0.39 (4.79) 61
Private Pensions 1.68 (4.78) -0.39 (3.91) 61
Insurance Companies 2.37 (20.13) -0.28 (3.67) 61
46Table VII
Semi-elasticity of Demand Curves, by Group
This table presents estimates of the semi-elasticity of the demand curve for Treasury securities, by group.
The dependent variable is the corporate bond yield spread, measured as the spread between the Moody’s
AAA long maturity bond yield and the average yield on long maturity (> 10 years) Treasury bonds. Both
data series are from the Federal Reserve. Controls include the spread between Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s
AAA long maturity bond yields, a time trend, and the spread between the 10 year Treasury yield and the
3 month Treasury yield (slope). All regressions include a constant. The demand curves are estimated
using the total stock of Treasury debt (log(Debt/GDP)) and Foreign Oﬃcial Holdings (log(θFOH/GDP))
as instruments. First stage estimates are reported in Panel A and second stage estimates are reported in
Panel B. The last column in Panel B reports the p-value from the test of the overidentifying restrictions. The
Treasury holdings data are from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve, and are annual (Q2)
from 1945 to 2005, except for the Foreign Private Sector for which data begin in 1957. t-statistics based on
Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses.
Panel A: 1st Stage Panel B: 2nd Stage
Group Coeﬃcient on Semi- Overid Test
log(Debt/GDP) log(θFOH/GDP) elasticity p-value
State/Local Governments 0.60 (3.59) -0.27 (1.90) -1.10 (5.06) 0.92
Banks/Credit Institutions 0.67 (8.69) -0.11 (1.52) -1.03 (3.54) 0.68
Households and Mutual Funds 1.13 (13.41) -0.22 (3.24) -0.61 (3.23) 0.73
Foreign Private Sector 3.04 (6.24) 0.01 (0.02) -0.44 (6.19) 0.94
State/Local Retirement Funds 1.76 (6.04) -1.06 (3.64) -0.34 (4.72) 0.36
Private Pensions 1.65 (4.71) 0.36 (1.30) -0.34 (3.84) 0.01
Insurance Companies 2.39 (25.52) -0.26 (3.40) -0.29 (3.76) 0.33
47Table VIII
Change in Demand
This table presents regressions for the sample prior to 1971 and the sample after 1971. The dependent
variables are the percentage spread between the Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yield and the average
yield on long maturity (> 10 years) Treasury bonds; and, the percentage diﬀerence between, (1) the return
from investing in 6-month commercial paper in January and rolling over in July until the next January, and
(2) the return from rolling over Treasury bills over the same period. Control for credit risk is the spread
between Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yields. All regressions include a constant.
t-statistics based on Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses. Data are annual, beginning in 1925,
except for the CP-Bills spread regression where data begin in 1920. Data end in 2005.
Dependent Variable
AAA − Treas CP − Bills
< 1971 ≥ 1971 < 1971 ≥ 1971
log(Debt/GDP) -0.52 (6.67) -1.15 (4.20) -0.60 (5.91) -0.75 (1.45)
BAA − AAA 0.16 (4.23) 0.13 (1.00) 0.18 (2.48) 0.27 (1.01)
R2 0.76 0.59 0.60 0.28
N 46 35 50 35
48Table IX
Exponential Speciﬁcation
We estimate the following relation:
St = b0 + b1eb2×(Debt/GDP) + cY t +  t.
where, St is the spread between the Moody’s AAA long maturity bond
yield and the average yield on long maturity (> 10 years) Treasury bonds,
both measured in percentage units. Yt are controls that include the spread
between Moody’s BAA minusMoody’s AAA long maturitybond yields, and
the spread between the 10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury
yield (slope). The control variables have been demeaned in the regressions.
t-statistics based on Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses.
Data are annual, beginning in 1925 and ending in 2005.
(1) (2) (3)
b0 0.07 (0.42) 0.13 (0.94)
b1 2.45 (9.50) 2.48 (8.22) 2.66 (6.76)
b2 -3.03 (9.45) -3.31 (3.85) -3.78 (4.38)
BAA − AAA 0.07 (1.33)
slope 0.07 (2.02)
R2 0.91 0.61 0.67
N 81 81 81
49Table X
Value of Aggregate Liquidity
This table presents estimates of the value of aggregate liquid-
ity/convenience of Treasury securities. We report how much in-
vestors will be willing to pay, as a yearly ﬂow cost (percentage of
GDP), in order to enjoy the beneﬁts of a particular level of Trea-
suries/GDP, starting from a scenario with a Treasury/GDP ratio
of zero. We present results for the exponential speciﬁcation with
b0 =0 ,b1 =2 .5a n db2 = −3.3.
Relative Risk Aversion
Treasuries/GDP γ =0 γ =1 γ =5 γ =1 0
0.1 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.11
0.2 0.37 0.30 0.21 0.16
0.3 0.48 0.37 0.25 0.19
0.38 0.54 0.41 0.27 0.21
0.5 0.61 0.46 0.29 0.23
1 0.73 0.52 0.33 0.25
3 0.76 0.54 0.34 0.26
50Table XI
Alternative Default Controls
This table presents regressions for alternative default controls. The dependent variable is the percentage
spread between the Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yield and the average yield on long maturity (>
10 years) Treasury bonds. Controls include the spread between Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s AAA long
maturity bond yields and the spread between the 10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury yield
(slope). Additional default controls are based on the percentage of companies that fail in a given year
(pctfailed and dnb−pctfailed, as described in the text), and the annual volatility of the stock market over
the preceding three years (volatility). All regressions include a constant. t-statistics based on Newey-West
robust standard errors in parentheses.
pctfailed dnb− pctfailed volatility
1963 - 2003 1927 - 1997 1928 - 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Debt/GDP) -1.43 (5.53) -1.36 (4.31) -0.82 ( 6.52) -0.94 (6.12) -0.78 (6.57) -0.79 (5.65)
BAA − AAA 0.17 (1.34) 0.10 (1.89) 0.06 (0.74)
pctfailed 0.12 (2.16) 0.07 (1.15)
dnb− pctfailed -0.09 (0.62) -0.36 (2.28)
volatility 3.07 (3.33) 0.87 (0.50)
slope 0.06 (1.16) 0.11 (2.46) 0.04 (1.18)
R2 0.54 0.64 0.60 0.71 0.60 0.62
N 41 41 71 71 77 77
51Table XII
Control for Tax Eﬀects
This table presents results from including a control for state tax eﬀects in our main
regressions. The dependent variable is the corporate bond yield spread, measured
as the spread between the Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yield and the average
y i e l do nl o n gm a t u r i t y( > 10 years) Treasury bonds, both measure in percentage
units. Both data series are from the Federal Reserve. Independent variables are
based on the real book value of Treasury debt outstanding, real US GDP, and the
spread between Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yields. The
tax rate variable (taxrate×AAA) is computed from the IRS publication Statistics
of Income as described in the text. All regressions include a constant. t-statistics
based on Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses. Data are annual,
beginning in 1944 and ending in 2003.
(1) (2) (3)
log(Debt/GDP) -0.89 (6.04) -0.69 (3.30) -0.69 (3.84)
taxrate × AAA 0.48 (1.76) -0.16 (0.47)
BAA − AAA 0.47 (3.25)
N 60 60 60
Table XIII
Regressions, by Subsample
This table presents regressions for diﬀerent subsamples. The dependent variable is the percentage
spread between the Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yield and the average yield on long maturity
(> 10 years) Treasury bonds. Controls include the spread between Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s
AAA long maturity bond yields and the spread between the 10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month
Treasury yield (slope). All regressions include a constant. t-statistics based on Newey-West robust
standard errors in parentheses. Data are annual, beginning in 1925 and ending in 2005.
(1) (2) (3)
Excluding 1942-1951 Excluding 1925-1941 Excluding 1925-1951
log(Debt/GDP) -0.99 (6.34) -0.72 (4.57) -1.19 (5.64)
BAA − AAA 0.07 (1.36) 0.34 (3.04) 0.24 (2.02)
slope -0.08 (1.96) 0.02 (0.58) 0.05 (1.25)
R2 0.63 0.65 0.71
N 71 64 54
52Table XIV
Scaling by Assets
This table presents result from redoing regressions by scaling the stock of publicly held debt by household
ﬁnancial assets (including mutual fund assets) from the Flow of Funds Accounts instead of US GDP. The
dependent variables are the percentage spread between the Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yield and
the average yield on long maturity (> 10 years) Treasury bonds; the percentage diﬀerence between, (1)
the return from investing in 6-month commercial paper in January and rolling over in July until the next
January, and (2) the return from rolling over Treasury bills over the same period; and, the 10 year interest
rate swap spread. Controls include the spread between Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s AAA long maturity
bond yields, and the spread between the 10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury yield (slope).
All regressions include a constant. t-statistics based on Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses.
Data are annual, beginning in 1945, except for the swap spread regression where data begin in 1987. Data
end in 2005.
Dependent Variable
AAA − Treas CP − Bills SwapSpread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Debt/FinAss) -0.64 (4.64) -0.64 (4.46) -0.21 (1.22) -0.01 (0.06) -0.37 (1.40) -0.09 (0.33)
BAA − AAA 0.51 (4.92) 0.50 (4.74) 0.33 (2.14) 0.59 (4.57) 0.48 (1.82) 0.79 (3.08)
slope 0.00 (0.11) -0.25 (5.49) -0.15 (4.11)
R2 0.53 0.68 0.17 0.45 0.27 0.56
N 61 61 61 61 19 19
53Table XV
Publicly held Debt, excluding Fed Holdings
This table presents result from redoing regressions by excluding Federal Reserve holdings from the deﬁnition
of the stock of outstanding debt. The Federal Reserve holdings are availablefrom the Flow of Funds Accounts
starting in 1945. The dependent variablesare the percentage spread between the Moody’s AAA long maturity
bond yield and the average yield on long maturity (> 10 years) Treasury bonds; the percentage diﬀerence
between, (1) the return from investing in 6-month commercial paper in January and rolling over in July
until the next January, and (2) the return from rolling over Treasury bills over the same period; and, the
10 year interest rate swap spread. Controls include the spread between Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s AAA
long maturity bond yields, and the spread between the 10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury
yield (slope). All regressions include a constant. t-statistics based on Newey-West robust standard errors in
parentheses. Data are annual, beginning in 1945, except for the swap spread regression where data begin in
1987. Data end in 2005.
Dependent Variable
AAA − Treas CP − Bills SwapSpread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Debt−FED/GDP) -0.61 (4.55) -0.64 (4.40) -0.37 (2.56) -0.14 (0.95) -0.36 (0.67) -0.05 (0.13)
BAA − AAA 0.42 (3.89) 0.39 (3.62) 0.21 (1.37) 0.50 (4.43) 0.39 (0.92) 0.79 (2.73)
slope 0.03 (0.66) -0.23 (4.67) -0.16 (4.11)
R2 0.69 0.69 0.23 0.47 0.22 0.55
N 61 61 61 61 19 19
54Table XVI
Level of Interest Rates
This table presents results from including the level of real or nominal interest rates as control. The
dependent variable is the corporate bond yield spread, measured as the spread between the Moody’s
AAA long maturity bond yield and the average yield on long maturity (> 10 years) Treasury bonds,
both measure in percentage units. Both data series are from the Federal Reserve. Independent
variables are based on the real book value of Treasury debt outstanding, real US GDP, the spread
between Moody’s BAA minus Moody’s AAA long maturity bond yields, and the spread between the
10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury yield (slope). The real interest rate is computed
as the average Federal Funds rate over the year minus either the CPI inﬂation for the same year
(ex-post real) or the inﬂation for the preceding year (ex-ante real). The nominal interest rates is the
Moody’s AAA yield. All regressions include a constant. t-statistics based on Newey-West robust
standard errors in parentheses. The real interest rate regressions use data from 1955 to 2005. The
nominal rate regression used data from 1925 to 2005.
(1) (2) (3)
log(Debt/GDP) -1.32 (4.80) -1.25 (5.30) -0.61 (5.43)
BAA − AAA 0.19 ( 0.94) 0.25 (1.76) 0.12 (2.53)
slope 0.06 (1.22) 0.05 (1.11) 0.02 (0.59)
Ex-post Real 0.005 (0.19)
Ex-ante Real -0.01 (0.44)
Nominal AAA 0.04 (3.33)
R2 0.70 0.70 0.68
N 55 55 81
55